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This study effort validates the appropriateness of em-
ploying the Delphi technique to establish measures of
effectiveness for support type functions.
The reason some processes are unmeasurable and the
difficulties of measuring outputs are discussed. A model
is developed for determining the effectiveness of a security
organization and a step-by-step procedure is provided for
instituting an effectiveness evaluation. The preparation of
a Delphi questionnaire for establishing goals and for
weighting the goals is presented, from which a panel of
security experts in an iterative process assigns values to
each goal to provide a medium for measuring effectiveness.
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In most industrial processes, outputs are definable and
measurable. A lathe can turn down 2" steel rods to 1.896"
+ .005" and the output of the machine is quantifiable and
measurable. And so it is with other product type operations
Output may be in inches, pieces, pounds or other units and
its attributes are easily measurable. Generally speaking,
the outputs of most processes are measurable.
Because output is a factor in computing effectiveness,
if output is not measurable, how then is effectiveness
determined? In the public sector, processes abound in which
output is vague or difficult to define. Examples appear in
such activities as recreation, public health and national
defense. Quantifying the extent of physical security
provided by our national defense effort is a baffling
problem for the experts who are involved in its study on a
daily basis. Measures such as flying hours used or extent
of border patrolled are meaningless when related to the
security of the population. An aircraft company can measure
its output by the number of airplanes leaving its plant.
But the Air Force unit that uses the airplanes and has as
its mission the task of protecting the coastal perimeter
from enemy intrusion finds that just defining its output can
be a most difficult and perhaps impossible job.

But why put all this emphasis on output? If we do our
job is it not enough? The answer of course is not a simple
yes or no. By doing our job we gain some degree of satis-
faction in knowing we are producing something. And if our
product measures up to some preselected goal we are also
effective in our job. But, if the output is vague or
unmeasurable, and no goal or objective has been established,
we may not only be unproductive but also ineffective.
Our capitalistic economy established profit as the
primary goal for industry. Profit is that which enables
business concerns to survive. In fact, in a laissez-faire
economy, earned profit would be the only criteria for
determining whether or not a business should survive. Maxi-
mizing the profit while holding expenditures constant is a
very viable measure of effectiveness. Government activities
however are seldom engaged in profit making endeavors so a
new set of guidelines is required for effectivity measures
in the public sector.
A concept analogous to profit, one that is increasingly
used by government when profit measures are nonexistent, is
benefit-cost analysis. Charles J. Stokes [Ref. 1, p. 184]
cites an example of a highway constructed in a developing
nation where the benefit to cost ratio was computed to be
8.3 to 1. But this was the direct benefit. A factor not
considered in the calculations was the loss of the agricul-
tural land with a subsequent reduction in food, fibre and
10

fuel production. It is possible that more productive use
could and should have been made of the capital funds used to
build the highway.
Benefit-cost analysis can suffer from the same malady as
effectivity analysis - the difficulty of measuring the
benefit or output. Measuring the benefit is usually much
more difficult than measuring the cost. Benefits may be
difficult to express in monetary terms if they have no
market price.
B. STATEMENT OF PROBLEM
A model has been developed by Lyden and Miller for eval-
uating program effectiveness [Pef. 2, p. 141] that requires
a complete description and measurement of each variable of a
program. If a variable or portion of a variable cannot be
measured, the model cannot be fully applied. In many
government activities, indicators that might be used to
judge effectiveness are difficult to quantify. A Naval Air
Station provides support and services for other activities
and exists as a general rule only as a support activity.
The major portion of work performed by Air Station personnel
is of the overhead type, although some direct and reimburs-
able effort is accomplished.
A Naval Air Station Security Department performs various
functions related to base and physical security. The Air
Station Commanding Officer is responsible for all security
within his command, and for the physical security of all
facilities within the confines of the Naval installation.
11

Physical security is that part of an overall security
program which is concerned with the physical measures de-
signed to prevent unauthorized access to equipment, facil-
ities, material and documents and to safeguard them against
espionage, sabotage, damage, theft or other covert acts
which would in some degree lessen the ability of the activity
to perform its mission or affect overall material interests.
The difficulty of determining the effectiveness of this
type of operation is apparent from the above description.
Effectivity measures are determined by describing mission
related functions, identifying quantitative indicators,
assigning objectives or goals to each indicator and measur-
ing the degree of achievement of the objectives.
The Security operation has evaded attempts to quantify
mission related output by the very nature of its work. By
skillful application of cost benefit analysis it may be
possible to devise a method for evaluating alternatives of
choice, but no treatment has evolved for applying measures
of effectiveness to this type of work. This paper will
attempt to devise applicable measures.
C. DIFFICULTIES OF MEASURING SOME PROCESSES, OUTPUTS OR
ACCOMPLISHMENTS
All processes have value in that some money is paid for
them. In the private sector of our economy, values are
determined in markets, and value is equal to the market
price. In the public sector, outputs that are not easily
measurable cannot equate to a market price that does not
12

exist. Here the problem of unmeasurables forces an innova-
tive method for evaluating effectiveness that is foreign to
private enterprise. A direct example is a Security Depart-
ment in a Naval Air Station. How do you measure the effec-
tiveness of base security? The number of persons apprehend-
ed for some security violation might give a hint as to the
seriousness of the problem. But how deep is the problem?
What percentage of the total violators are caught? Just how
effective are the security operators?
The problem might be viewed from the opposite perspec-
tive. How many workers have never been cited for a viola-
tion? Or, what percentage of our assets are intact? Would
any of these measures be a reflection of how well the
security department is performing? Regardless of how we
view the situation, measuring the effectiveness of a security
organization is a complex task.
The police are generally assumed accountable for in-
creases in all types of crime. It is questionable whether
they should be thus held responsible any more than the Fire
Department is held responsible for the number of fires.
Although both agencies employ preventive strategies and
investigate incidents after the fact, fire departments are
rated for insurance purposes primarily on their ability to
minimize the damage due to fires rather than on the number
of fires [Ref. 3, p. 454]. One can view the police role
similarly, as that of minimizing the harm caused by crime -
or caused by other problems handled by the police. There is
13

a major difference between developing measures of police
performance and developing measures to determine effective-
ness of programs to reduce crime.
D. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF EFFECTIVENESS MEASURES
An organization's mission is characterized by one or
more objectives which represent the output of that organiza-
tion. A manager is given certain inputs, or resources which
he uses to produce outputs. After the outputs are generated,
performance feedback information is needed to indicate how
well the manager utilized his resources to produce the out-
jputs ._ In effectiveness measures we are concerned with a com-





A situation or condition which responsible program
personnel consider desirable to attain [Bef. 2, p. 145].
The objective should contribute to attainment of the mission.
To permit subsequent evaluation, the statement of an objec-
tive must specify
- The nature of the situation or condition to be
attained.
- The quantity or amount of the situation or condi-
tion to be attained.
- The particular group of people or portion of the
environment in which attainment is desired.
- The geographic area of the program.
- The time at or by which the desired situation or





Productivity or Output Measures
Productivity is broadly defined as the ratio of out-
put per unit of input over time. Productivity compares the
amount of resources used with the volume of products or
jseryices produced. In the long run, productivity is improved
by innovation or changes in the means of production. In the
short run, productivity is improved by raising the efficien-
cy with which resources are utilized within the existing
system of production [Ref. 4].
The productivity concept refers to an accurately
measured total physical output of end-products of an organi-
zation, divided by the measure of the total amount of
resources used, such as total number of man-hours worked or
total cost in constant prices. In order to determine the
changes in aggregate outputs and factor inputs, and thus
productivity, it is necessary to combine unlike types of
output and of input units by weights that indicate their
relative importance for the purpose at hand [Ref. 5, p. 8].
Productivity indices are not precise measures of
productiveness. However, one of the principal uses of
productivity indices is in the area of manpower forecasting
for both short and long-range planning. Productivity
measures can be used to assess manpower utilization and
allocation and very importantly, it can be used to assess
the effect of capital equipment expenditures on output.
The emphasis here as in much of the private and
public sector has been in increased productivity with no
15

mention of effectivity. The literature on productivity or
efficiency is voluminous. A plethora of studies have been
undertaken and numerous models developed for determining
productivity indices but few works exist on effectiveness.
There is an awareness that has been growing over the
last few years that there is a need for measures of effec-
tiveness in relationship to costs.
Effectiveness has been a concern of engineers since
1887 when Arthur M. Wellington wrote his treatise on the
economic theory of Railway Location. It was during the
1930 's that the concept of cost benefit analysis into
evaluation of public works was introduced. This was an
approach that compared the benefits translated into dollars
with the equivalent dollar cost.
During the 1940' s Eugene Grant brought about a wide-
spread awareness on the part of engineers of the need for
economic evaluation of engineering projects. Following
World War II, the field of operations research provided a
greatly expanded viewpoint of economic evaluation. Tools
such as linear programming, methods of optimization, and the
like, coupled with the means for solution afforded by the
computer, have made possible more meaningful evaluations
[Ref. 6, p. 2, 3].
3 . Efficiency
Efficiency is described as the ratio of actual
performance numbers to standard performance numbers usually
expressed as a percentage.
16

ACTUAL PERFORMANCE (NUMBERS )
STANDARD PERFORMANCE (NUMBEJ
Ireson and Grant in their Handbook of Industrial
LUMB RS) X 10 ° [ Ref - 7 > P- 588]
Engineering and Management
,
[Ref. 8 ] in speaking of
organization efficiency state:
The criterion of efficiency requires the fulfil-
ment of the personal and individual objectives
of those who are connected with the enterprise.
This definition, it should be noted, departs
somewhat from general business usage. "Effic-
iency," used in this sense, rests on the premise
that the company has met the criterion of
effectiveness and can fulfill its financial
obligations
.
Deniston, Rosenstock, Welch and Getting [Ref. 2,
p. 143] describe efficiency as:
The cost in resources of attaining objectives.
The efficiency of a program may be unrelated
to its effectiveness, adequacy, and appro-
priateness .
Efficiency then is defined in different ways depend-
ing upon objectives. For a production operation it is a
ratio of actual to standard performance. For an organization
it is the fulfillment of personal and individual objectives,




Effectiveness is variously described as (1) the
extent to which preestablished objectives are attained as a
result of planned activity [Ref. 2, p. 143], or (2) a com-
parison between present period performance and stated
objectives [Ref. 6, p. 3] , or (3) the desirable effects or
17

benefits gained by reason of the expenditure or incurring of
a cost. Effectiveness also connotes some measure of per-
formance or level of output of the benefit producing system
[Ref. 9, p. 4].
Terms Often Used to imply the concept of effective-
Utility - Favored by economists
Productivity - Results oriented
Worth
- Favored by engineers
Merit - Operations research carryover
Benefit - Favored by Bureau of the Budget
F. SCOPE OF THIS THESIS
In searching the literature on this subject, no current,
applicable works were found to provide guidance on measuring
the effectiveness of a Naval Air Station security force. The
existence of studies in cost effectiveness, organizational
effectiveness and personal effectiveness all strive to
improve corporate profit as a final measure of effectivity.
To provide a means of determining the effectiveness of a
security organization a model for a measure of effectiveness
was developed and is the subject of this thesis.
To determine effectiveness, specific measures of accom-
plishment for preestablished objectives are evaluated in
relation to goals. A comparison of performance to stated
objectives will provide a basis for determination of effec-
tiye_ne_ss_. The mechanics of measurement in a profit making
organization have been thoroughly described in other works.
This model develops a method for arriving at (1) objectives,
(2) quantitative indicators and (3) a concensus opinion

through an iterative process utilizing the Delphi technique
The Delphi method is credited with providing a method for
selecting realistic and realizable goals and assigning
specific weights for each indicator.
19

II. DEVELOPMENT OF A MODEL FOR A MEASURE OF EFFECTIVENESS
In the development of a model for effectiveness measures
several basic considerations are predominant. These consid-
erations may be listed in the following sequence:
Describe organization mission requirements.
Determine the primary elements accomplishing
the mission.
Identify quantitative indicators.
Establish quantitative goals or objectives for
each indicator.
Weight each indicator.
Measure degree of achievement of each goal.
Evaluate effectiveness.
A. MISSION REQUIREMENTS
In a military establishment, the organization's mission
is relatively easy to determine. A statement of mission may
be obtained from the organization manual or directive from
higher authority. The mission statement must be examined
for goal directing statements. The phrasing of the mission
will provide information for the development of the next
step.
B. ELEMENTS FOR ACCOMPLISHING MISSION
Functions performed in support of the mission may be
identified from the mission statement. A determination must
be made of whether the effort will lead to accomplishment of
the ultimate mission. A program may encompass several sub-
objectives in order to achieve the ultimate objective. A
careful review of the performance of the organization's
activities will provide information of a primary objective
20

or subobjective nature. In the measurement of effectiveness,
it is only the actions that lead to achievement of the
primary or ultimate goal that are used in this model.
As an example, the security department registers
vehicles for authorized entry on the base. A portion of the
mission infers that unauthorized entry will be prevented.
The act of registering the vehicles, while a necessary part
of overall control, will not in itself satisfy the mission
requirement. The prevention of unauthorized access will be
accomplished by a gate check and a display of valid identi-
fication. The registering of vehicles is considered to be a
subobjective and need be evaluated only if the sum of the
subobjectives will be used in the determination of the
ultimate mission objective. Major attention to objectives
is necessary because of the importance of distinguishing
between objectives and subobjectives.
The security program is characterized by several objec-
tives which represent the desired end result of the security
activities. Each objective implies one or more subobjectives
or intermediate objectives which must be accomplished in
order that the security program objective may be accomplished
To perform a meaningful evaluation it is necessary first
to establish the specific mission that the program is to
fulfill.
In a conference with the Security Department Management
Personnel, requirements were identified whose fulfillment is
21

essential to the attainment of the security mission. These
requirements are in consonance with the department mission
statement.




2. Failure to secure
3. Response time
In describing the objectives, emphasis was given to pro-
viding those that are measurable. The department mission
statement specifies that unauthorized access to equipment,
facilities, material and documents will be prevented. The
base admission category satisfies this requirement. Cate-
gory 2, failure to secure, was selected to describe that
part of the mission that requires safeguarding against
espionage, sabotage, damage, theft or other covert acts, and
protecting equipment, facilities, material and documents.
It is intended that this objective will focus on the number
of incidents occurring.
The last objective is response time which will provide
an indication of the time delay between receiving a call
for assistance and the actual arrival of the security
personnel.
C. QUANTITATIVE INDICATORS
The most difficult part of an effectiveness study in a
government service organization is to identify meaningful
quantitative indicators. This step requires identification
of the kind of evidence needed to determine that an objective
22

has or has not been achieved. The validity of a measure is
the extent that an obtained score measures the characteris-
tic that it is intended to measure.
The use of indicators to assess program effectiveness
has been sharply criticized by Sheldon and Freeman [Ref. 10,
p. 80].
The use of indicators to measure outcomes of
programs could lead to the most egregious
statistical manipulation, for herein lies the
arbitrary selection and control of variables
that could virtually prescribe results without
reference to important determining factors and
casual interrelationships
.
The criticism of the use of indicators points out the
need to avoid an arbitrary selection and to perform an
unbiased analysis and to select variables that are meaning-
ful and contribute to the accomplishment of the mission. In
accord with this reasoning, each of the primary security
functions was broken down into elements that could yield a
numerical value. The total value of the elements when
properly weighted should provide an indication of the
effectivity of the primary function. For the primary
function "Base Admission", three quantitative indicators
were selected. These are: (1) Unauthorized people in the
control area; (2) Unauthorized vehicles on the base; (3)
Unauthorized material or equipment that is brought aboard




The setting of goals can be accomplished in a variety of
ways, such as through an intuitive process, or more commonly
by a review of historical trends. The method recommended
here and applied to the Naval Air Station Security Depart-
ment was formulated using the Delphi technique for reaching
a concensus of opinion.
Each indicator that was selected was evaluated for the
extent to which achievement could reasonably be obtained
giving consideration to existing constraints. A group of
security experts through an iterative process established
achievable goals that were to be used in the effectiveness
determination
.
The goals will provide a basis for comparison with
actual performance to yield a measure of effectiveness.
It has been suggested that for a security function,
nothing less than 1.00 reliability is acceptable. Relia-
bility as used in this context is defined as the probability
that a security violation will go undetected for a given
period of time. As an example, one of the quantitative
indicators establishes a goal for the percentage of unauthor-
ized people in the control area. Precisely what is meant by
See Appendix for a description of the questionnaires
used in this study.
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/stating that the goal for this indicator is 0.2? Generally,
it is interpreted to mean that 98 times out of 100, un-
authorized personnel will be prevented from entering or be
apprehended in the control area. It also means that two
times out of 100 unauthorized personnel will be undetected
in the control area.
Security like safety, is one of the most difficult
criteria to evaluate. Western society places an almost
infinite value on human life. Yet, if some risks were not
acceptable, space missions would never be undertaken. It is
recognized that the risk of death accompanies many accepted
human activities and that these risks are realized and
accepted. The risk associated with air travel is accepted
for the greater convenience over other modes of transporta-
tion. The same rationale can be applied to security. If
some risks are not acceptable, the base would be forced to
close. Even the expenditure of huge amounts of money, and
the installation of the most advanced technological detec-
tion systems would not give 100% assurance that a security
violation will go undetected.
E. ESTABLISHING WEIGHTING FACTORS
The relative contribution for achievement of goals can
be established by the assignment of weights to each indica-
tor. A high weight indicates that more importance or more
emphasis is attached to that element than to one with a
lower weight. The weights are determined in a manner similar
to that for which values were assigned to the goals.
25

The group of security experts were asked to evaluate
each indicator and the quantitative goal established for
each and to assign a weight that would provide an indication
of the relative contribution of each one. The Delphi method
was used to arrive at a concensus opinion for the weighting
of each indicator. To illustrate how the weights are
applied, the following example is given:
The specific goal for unauthorized people in
the control area is 2%, and the weight assigned
is 5%. (The total weight distribution to all
elements is 100%) . If a survey revealed 94% of
the people in the control area were authorized
to be there, the percentage of goal achieved would
be 94/9 8 or 96%. The weighted program element
is 96% x 5% = 4.8%. The sum of all the
weighted elements will provide a total program
valuation as a percentage of a possible 100.
F. MEASURE DEGREE OF ACHIEVEMENT OF EACH GOAL
Once goals have been established it is necessary to
determine how well the organization did in meeting the goal.
The measurement may be accomplished in one of several ways.
1. Survey the Population
This may be accomplished by taking a random sample,






While not very practical due to the high cost and
time required, such a check can be accomplished by inspect-
ing every vehicle and person coming aboard the station.
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3 . Use of Planted Personnel or Conditions
This method would require the selection of personnel
to attempt an unauthorized entry. The number apprehended
would give an indication of the effectiveness of the secur-
ity force. The same method can be applied to classified
material or open safes. By deliberately allowing selected
unsecured classified material or safes, an indication of
effectiveness can be had from the number identified.
G. EVALUATE EFFECTIVENESS
The evaluation of effectiveness will consider the degree
of achievement of each goal, the weight assignment and the
overall measure of effectiveness for the organization. Each
indicator should be reviewed to determine if added emphasis
is required in any area. The evaluation phase of the







When faced with a decision that isn't clearly determined
by very good information, we can turn to a group, a council,
a committee, a panel or a commission. The reason for using
this procedure is that with any group there is more informa-
tion collectively in the heads of the group than there is in
the head of a single member of the group. Unfortunately,
that is not quite enough, because with any group there is
more misinformation than there is in any one head, and by
convening the group, you may be putting the misinformation
together to come up with the worst judgement.
The standard way of using a group is to convene a face-
to-face discussion. In short, issues are raised, they are
hashed over, information is traded, and the group is asked
to come up with their best judgement on the subject.
The traditional way of pooling individual opinions is by
face-to-face discussion. Norman Dalkey of the Rand Corpora-
tion described some difficulties with face-to-face inter-
action [Ref. 11, p. 3] as follows:
We've conducted experiments at Rand where we've con-
vened groups and asked questions for which we knew
the answers, but no one in the group really knew the
answer. When the face-to-face discussion technique
was used the answers of the group got worse after
the discussion. We polled them beforehand, asking
them to give their judgement on these questions; then
we let them talk it through and reformulate their
judgements. More often than not, after the discus-
sion the judgements were worse than they were in the
28

beginning. The major reason is that in a group
discussion there are always one or two dominant
individuals who take over the discussion and do
most of the talking. In our experiments we
found that you can almost predict the direction
in which the group opinion is going to shift by
just measuring the amount of time that each
individual talks
.
From the above it can be concluded that group opinion is
highly influenced by the person who talks the most, and there
is very little correlation between pressure of speech and
knowledge
.
A second element that interferes with arriving at sound
judgement is the social situation that prevails. Much of
the discussion has to do with maintaining prestige and
relative position in the group. Individual and group inter-
ests that are not related to the problem solving purpose of
convening the group consume much of the time and effort of
the group.
A final consideration is group pressure for conformity.
The group itself has an enormous effect and creates a strong
pressure on the more timid members of the group to conform.




The Delphi is a group process which utilizes written
responses as opposed to bringing individuals together. It
lets people remain anonymous and prevents domination by
certain individuals. Delphi avoids the difficulties of
face-to-face discussion and at the same time maintains the
29

obvious advantage of the group. Delphi is essentially a
series of questionnaires. The first asks individuals to
respond to a broad question. Each subsequent questionnaire
is built upon responses to the preceding questionnaire. The
process stops when concensus has been approached among par-
ticipants, or when sufficient information exchange has been
obtained [Ref. 12, p. 83].
Delphi was originally developed by the Rand Corporation
in the late 1940 's to obtain the most reliable consensus of
a group of experts. Essentially, the Delphi is a series of
intensive interrogations of individual experts concerning
some primary question interspersed with controlled feedback.
The procedures are designed to avoid direct confrontation.
Interaction among the experts is accomplished through an
intermediary who gathers the data from the experts and
summarizes it along with the expert's answers to the primary
question. This mode of controlled interaction is a deliber-
ate attempt to avoid the disadvantages associated with more
conventional uses of experts such as is in round table
discussions or direct confrontation of opposing views. The
developers of the Delphi argue the procedures are more con-
ducive to independent thought and allow more gradual formu-
lation to a considered opinion [Ref. 13].
Typically, the answer to the primary question is a
numerical quantity. It is expected that the individual
experts' estimates will tend to converge as the experiment
continues even if the estimates expressed initially are
30

widely divergent. Delphi involves three general ideas:






A formal questionnaire is the usual mode of communi-
cating the opinions of members of the group and no answer is
matched to an individual. Anonymity is a way of reducing
the effect of dominant individuals. Delphi can also be used
to aggregate judgements where people are hostile toward one
another, or where individual personality styles would be
distracting in a face-to-face setting.
2. Iteration and Feedback
The exchange of information or feedback is very
carefully controlled by the intermediary. It is planned
that the iteration occurs in a series of stages and at each
stage the information which has been generated by the group
in the previous stage is fed back. In this manner the
socializing and personal interest discussions are eliminated
and the views of individual experts are not subjected to
criticism in face-to-face confrontation.
3. Statistical Group Response
Normally, after several iterations, the group
opinion converges. That is, the individual opinions come
closer and closer together, but do not come to a single
opinion. There is always some distribution of answers, even
on the final round, and rather than force a single opinion,
a statistical measure is taken. The median or the mean is
31

used as the group response. Even at the very end, the
opinion of every member of the group still plays a role in
determining the group answer.
In experiments conducted by Dalkey [Ref. 11], he
found that contrary to the results of the face-to-face type
of iteration, as the exercise proceeds more often than not
the opinions of the group become more accurate.
C. DELPHI PARTICIPANTS
The selection of a panel of participants is accomplished
from persons who can exercise expert judgement in the area
under consideration. The term "experts" is intended to
describe persons who have important knowledge or experience
to share. The persons selected to serve as the Delphi work
group should possess relevant information or experience
toward which the Delphi is aimed.
The ideal panel would be composed of persons who feel
personally involved, are motivated to participate in the
delphi study and have pertinent information to share. The
size of the panel is variable, but with a homogeneous group
not more than ten participants is recommended. This study,
performed at the Naval Air Station Point Mugu Security De-
partment, had a panel of six members, each of which was






In developing measures of effectiveness for the Naval
Air Station Security Department, the Delphi technique was
used to arrive at quantitative goals for various indicators
and to weight each indicator for relative importance in
relation to the whole.
The key to the Delphi process is the questionnaire. If
the respondents do not understand the initial broad question;
they may answer inappropriately or become frustrated with
the questionnaire and lose interest.
A. THE DELPHI QUESTIONNAIRE FOR ESTABLISHING GOAL
The questions submitted to the group experts were formu-
lated to provide an indication of the security performance.
A study of the department mission statement was accomplished
to extract information that could be formulated into goal
directing effort of a primary objective nature.
Six questions were prepared. The questions fulfill the
requirement that they will provide an indication of primary
objective effectiveness. Three questions relate to base
admission and one each to unauthorized material, unsecured
safes and reaction time. The purpose of the questionnaire
was to evolve a numerical value for each indicator that
could be used as the goal in striving for high effective-






Out of every 100 unauthorized persons who might
try to gain access to the installation through normal entry
gates, what is the minimum number that should be detected by
the gave guards?
Entry of persons to the installation is accomplished
by displaying an identification badge to the gate guard.
All personnel, military, dependents, civilian employees and
visitors are issued identification badges that are required
to be worn on outer clothing when in a classified area. The
color of the badge indicates the type of security clearance
held by the individual.
Passengers in vehicles entering the installation hold
their identification out for inspection by the gate guard
before being waved through. The identification badge has
the bearer's picture, name, activity and department on the
face. The reverse side has other vital statistics.
This question recognizes the fallibility of attempt-
ing to maintain 100% authorized only entry. In considering
monetary and manpower constraints the question is, how many
unauthorized entries are we willing to live with? In the
first iteration the mean was 95 or stated another way, 5%
unauthorized entries are acceptable. The second iteration
had minor changes in the wording. In place of asking for
"the minimum number that should be detected," the wording
was changed to "minimum acceptable number that should be
detected." This change was made for clarity purposes.
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The mean value on the second iteration, accepted as
the group concensus, was 9 8 (see Table I) . The goal estab-
lished for this indicator was 2% of unauthorized entries
will be acceptable. Anything more than 2% would be an in-




Out of every 100 unauthorized persons who might try
to gain access to the installation through other than normal
entry gates, what is the minimum acceptable number that
should be detected by the security forct?
The Naval Air Station, Point Mugu, has several miles
of ocean frontage. Undetected access in remote areas is
feasible under certain conditions. Recognizing this fact,
the group mean for this question was 44 for the first itera-
tion and 61 for the second. Most of the estimates were
raised on the second round after considered judgement and a
review of the answers to the first set.
3 . 3a.se Admission
Out of every 100 unauthorized vehicles that might
try to gain access to the installation through normal entry
gates } what is the minimum acceptable number that should be
detected by the gate guards?
A vehicle is given authorization to be driven on the
installation if the owner maintains at least a minimum
value insurance coverage and the vehicle passes a routine
safety inspection. Evidence of authorization is demonstra-
ted by a base decal affixed to the bumper, or on other
exposed area if other than a car or truck. Temporary
vehicle passes are issued by the visitor control desk for
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security guard will glance at the vehicle decal and then at
the driver and passenger identification before allowing
admittance
.
Violations can occur by not having a vehicle decal
or temporary pass, or having an out-of-date decal that
might indicate expiration of the driver's insurance. The
Delphi group indicated 92% on the first questionnaire and
9 8% on the second. The high numerical value is an indica-
tion of the ease of detection of unauthorized vehicles. On
the first round, five out of six participants assigned





Out of every 100 cases where an individual might try
to bring unauthorized material aboard the base ( guns 3 ex-
plisives j drugs j etc.) s what is the minimum acceptable
number that should be detected by the security force?
Detection of unauthorized material is most difficult
when no search is initiated of incoming persons or vehicles.
When a security guard suspects unauthorized material is
being covertly brought aboard he will institute a search.
The mean value for this item on the first iteration was
25. One participant assigned a value of zero. This was
changed on the second iteration where the mean rose to 33.
5 Unsecured Safes
Out of every 100 cases where a classified material
storage container has been left unsecured by the appropriate
custodian 3 how many should be detected by the ^security force':
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(1) Within 4 hours
(2) Within 8 hours
(3) Within 12 hours
(4) Within 24 hours
Most buildings are secured after hours and no entry
is made until the start of the next work day. Headquarters
buildings are continuously manned. Individual offices how-
ever, are locked at night after the custodial crew completes
its work. Unsecured classified material safes may be dis-
covered by the custodian or the security guard making a
routine check.
Results of the first questionnaire were incomplete so
clarifying remarks were provided for the second one. The
group mean for this question showed:
(1) Within 4 hours 62%
(2) Within 8 hours 86%
(3) Within 12 hours 100%
6 . Reaction Time
When a security alarm is sounded anywhere on the
installation 3 what is the maximum acceptable time (in minutes
)
between when the alarm is sounded and the security force
reaches the scene of the incident?
When a security alarm is sounded, it alerts the dis-
patcher in the security building. The dispatcher's desk is
manned on a 24-hour basis. The dispatcher in turn notifies
the security patrol by radio communication and the security
patrol proceeds to the scene of the incident.
On the first iteration, the Delphi group assigned a
mean value of 3.4 minutes for the security patrol to respond
to the alarm. The second iteration had a mean of 4.6 minutes
which was the accepted value for this item.

B. THE DELPHI QUESTIONNAIRE FOR ESTABLISHING WEIGHTS
To provide a department effectiveness measure, it is
necessary to integrate the various indicators into one overall
rating. The method for doing this is to weight each indica-
tor so that a maximum value of 100% will be obtained if the
organization meets the goal established for each indicator.
Indicator number six on the Delphi questionnaire is cited as
an example of how this is done. The statement is, "When a
security alarm is sounded anywhere on the installation, the
maximum acceptable time between when the alarm is sounded
and when the security force reaches the scene of the incident
is 4.6 minutes." This indicator is given a weight of 32%.
If it is determined that the average response time during
the reckoning period is 5.4 minutes, then 8 8% of the goal
has been achieved. The weighted score for this indicator
would then be 88% x 32% = 27%. Each of the indicators would
be weighted in this manner, and the weighted values would be
summed up to give a department effectiveness index. The
weight for each indicator was established by using the Delphi
method in the same manner that the goals were established.
See Table II for summary of weighting values.
The six indicators that were used to establish goals
were again incorporated into a questionnaire to gain the
group concensus of weighting values to assign. The questions














1 . Base A dm
i
Out of every 100 unauthorized persons who might try
to gain access to the installation through normal entry
gateSj 9_3_ should he detected by the gate guards.
The Delphi group gave this indicator a weight of nine
on the first iteration, and again nine on the second. The
low value of two and the top value of ten were both increased
on the second round. The increase was insufficient however,
to raise the mean higher than nine.
2
.
Base A dm is si on
Out of every 100 unauthorized persons who might try
to gain access to the installation through other than normal
entry gates 3 6l_ should be detected by the security force.
This item was assigned a weight of nine on the first
iteration and eight on the second. The Delphi group saw
little relative difference between this indicator and the
first one which was given a weight of nine. The scores had
very little variance indicating a general concensus at an
early stage.
3 Base Admission
Out of every 100 unauthorized vehicles that might
try to gain access to the installation through normal entry
gates, d_8_ should be dezected by the gate guards.
Here again, differences between the first and second
iteration were small. The mean value was five on the first
round and seven on the second. The goal for this indicator
was established at 9 8%, almost a completely perfect target,
yet, the security experts relegated this item to the lowest





Out of every 100 cases where an individual might try
to bring unauthorized material aboard the base 3 ( guns , ex-
plosives, drugs, etc.), 33_ should be detected by the security
force .
Weighting for this item was seven on the first
round, but was increased to 13 on the second. Some of the
lowest values were placed on this one in the first iteration.
The final weighting moved the item to a relative standing of
third from the top.
5 . Unsecured Safes
Out of every 100 cases where a classified material
storage container has been left unsecured by the appropriate
custodian, 62_ should be detected within 4 hours, 86_ should
be detected within 8 hours, 100 should be detected within
12 hours
.
This item received the highest weight by the Delphi
group. It was given a value of 38 on the first iteration
and 32 on the second. Unsecured classified material is
considered to be the most serious security infringement of
all the indicators. In discussing this item with the
assistant security officer, he expressed the thought that
all other security effort was more or less in support of
this one.
6 . Reaction Time
When a security alarm is sounded anywhere on the
instattatioitj the maximum acceptable time between when the
alarm is sounded and when the security force reaches the
scene of the incident is 4 . 3 minutes
.
This last item was ranked second in importance by
the rating group. On the first iteration it was given a
weight of 32 which was changed to 31 on the second round.
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Reaction time is considered to be of major importance to
base security and the maximum acceptable time of 4.6 minutes
is an indication of the effort expended in reacting to an
alarm.
C. INTEGRATING THE ELEiMENTS
Having established specific objectives and having each
objective weighted, it is now necessary to combine the
various elements into a single index of effectiveness. To
accomplish this, a measure of achievement in relation to the
objective will be required. This measure may be acquired
using one of the methods described earlier. To illustrate
how a single index is derived, a hypothetical situation is
described
.
Table III lists the six objectives and their numerical
goals in column 1. The weight assigned to each objective is
shown in column 2. The achievement of the security force
toward each goal is in column 3. The values listed in
column 3 are hypothetical and are used to illustrate the
mechanics involved in determining tbe effectiveness index.
Column 4 is the percentage of achievement of the goal and is
computed by dividing the percentage achievement in column 3
by the values in column 1. The weighted valuation shown in
column 5 is derived by multiplying the percentage of goal in
column 4 by the weight in column 2.
It is evident from Table III that the objectives given a
low weight contribute only a small part to the effectiveness
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weight of 7% contributed only 7% to the effectiveness index.
It is hypothetically possible to score an effectiveness
index greater than 100%, if the degree of goal achievement is
greater than 100% for several of the objectives. In such a
case it will be necessary to evaluate the numerical goal to
determine if a revision is warranted.
The effectiveness index calculated in Table III is 81.7%.
Once the index is determined, a periodic evaluation is
possible. Now an objective rating can be applied with the
confidence that the measure of effectiveness is a reflection





In the planning and development of security effectiveness
measures it was necessary to estimate the resource input that
would be applied. Budgetary and manpower limitations make it
infeasible to consider the application of more funds or man-
power than has been allocated to the department. The model
developed here assumes no change in resource input, but
sensitivity analysis can be undertaken to determine the
extent of a change in effectiveness by increasing or decreas-
ing funds or manpower.
It was stated earlier that 100% assurance can not be
given that a security violation will go undetected. One of
the effectiveness indicators relating to base admission states
that "out of every 100 unauthorized persons who might try to
gain access to the installation through other than normal
entry gates, 61 should be detected by the security force."
We could ask, what would be the increase in cost to raise the
figure to some number higher than 61?
The problem is to determine whether an additional amount
of effectiveness is worth the added amount of cost. There
are two methods for analysis of this problem without resort-
ing to a purely intuitive decision [Ref. 14, p. 72].
1. Specify a level of effectiveness which must be met,




2. Specify a level of cost which must not be exceeded,
and select that method which provides the highest level of
effectiveness without exceeding that cost.
Usually there is no one level of performance which can be
stated as an absolute requirement. For example, consider the
case mentioned above, where 61 out of 100 unauthorized
entries would be detected. It follows that the more funds
spent for security, the more protection would be provided,
though not necessarily in a one to one ratio.
Presenting the decision maker with a comparison of level
of effectiveness and cost by using the method above, the
optimum level can be chosen.
The resources expended to achieve a given objective can
in most cases be put in money terms; hence we try to compare
benefits or effectiveness with the cost incident to it.
What makes the problem difficult is that the benefits are
far more difficult to place on a monetary scale, and the
benefits are usually displaced in time from the expenditure
of resources
.
B. APPLICATION OF TECHNIQUE TO OTHER FUNCTIONS
When faced with limitations of time and money, a per-
functory analysis can not treat all the considerations that
may be relevant. In dealing with intangibles, judgement
and intuition can be applied, but deficiencies in quantita-
tive measurements are apparent. In dealing with difficult to
quantify considerations, it is the systematic and direct use
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of expert judgement that provides a framework for decision
making.
A single individual is not likely to provide the range of
expertise necessary to deal with complex problems. It is in-
evitable that a variety of experts be consulted. It is for
this reason, and to avoid the psychological drawbacks of
face-to-face discussion that the Delphi method was adopted.
The model described herein is not intended to be restrict-
ed to a security organization to the exclusion of other
functions. Its application is appropriate to recreation,
administration, personnel, legal, air operations, human
resources and other support type functions. The Delphi
technique provides a bridge to where scientific analysis and
objectivity are employable. It is a method to make the




This appendix contains the questionnaire and the results
of each iteration for establishing quantitative goals and for
weighting each goal.
QUESTIONNAIRE FOR SECURITY PLANNING
This questionnaire is the first in a series designed to
gain information related to managing the security effort.
This information will assist in providing insight into the
most important areas of security aboard the installation, the
allocation of resources to those areas of importance, and
measuring the effectiveness of the ongoing security program.
Your expertise in the security field will assist in develop-
ing these insights. Responses will not be attributed to the
individual, but composite results will be distributed to each
participant. Please reply carefully and thoughtfully, from
your professional point of view.
1. Below is a list of indicators which might be used to help
measure the effectiveness of the security force. For each in-
dicator listed, please indicate the number of violations, in
a one month period, that you would consider as a minimum ac-
ceptable operating target for the security force under current
funding and manpower levels.
a. BASE ADMISSION . Out of every 100 unauthor-
ized persons who might try to gain access to the
installation through normal entry gates, what is
the minimum number that should be detected by the
gate guards?
(Example of possible answer - 75)
b. BASE ADMISSION . Out of every 100 unauthor-
ized persons who might try to gain access to the
installation through other than normal entry gates,
what is the minimum number that should be detected
by the security force? _
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QUESTIONNAIRE FOR SECURITY PLANNING
This questionnaire is the first in a series designed to
gain information related to managing the security effort.
This information will assist in providing insight into the
most important areas of security aboard the installation, the
allocation of resources to those areas of importance, and
measuring the effectiveness of the ongoing security program.
Your expertise in the security field will assist in develop-
ing these insights. Responses will not be attributed to the
individual, but composite results will be distributed to each
participant. Please reply carefully and thoughtfully, from
your professional point of view.
1. Below is a list of indicators which might be used to help
measure the effectiveness of the security force. For each in-
dicator listed, please indicate the number of violations, in
a one month period, that you would consider as a minimum ac-
ceptable operating target for the security force under current
funding and manpower levels.
a. BASE ADMISSION . Out of every 100 unauthor-
ized persons who might try to gain access to the
installation through normal entry gates, what is
the minimum number that should be detected by the
gate guards?
(Example of possible answer - 75)
b. BASE ADMISSION . Out of every 100 unauthor-
ized persons who might try to gain access to the
installation through other than normal entry gates,
what is the minimum number that should be detected




. Out of every 100 unauthor-
ized vehicles that might try to gain access to the
installation through normal entry gates, what is
.the minimum number that should be detected by the
gate guards?
d. UNAUTHORIZED MATERIAL . Out of every 100
cases where an individual might try to bring un-
authorized material aboard the base (guns, explo-
sives, cameras, drugs, etc.), how many should be
detected by the security force as a minimum?
(Be realistic)
.
e. UNSECURED SAFES . Out of every 100 cases
where a classified material storage container has
been left unsecured by the appropriate custodian,
how many should be detected by the security force'
(1) Within 4 hours?
(2) Within 8 hours?
(3) Within 12 hours?
(4) Within 24 hours?
f. REACTION TIME When a security alarm is
sounded anywhere on the installation, what is
the minimum acceptable reaction time with which
the security force should respond?
2. What additional quantitative indicators can you think of
which are not presently included in the above list?
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6 July 19 76
RESULTS OF THE FIRST QUESTIONNAIRE
FOR SECURITY PLANNING
1. Six responses to the initial questionnaire were received
2. Results of the first four questions are:
a b c d
90 10 100 10
100 10 50
90 50 100 5
95 90 100 10
99 2 *100 23
Mean
98 100 100 100
(average) 95 44 92 25
QUESTIONS
*Rounded to 10 by
the referee
a. BASE ADMISSION. Out of every 100 unauthorized
persons who might try to gain access to the installation
through normal entry gates, what is the minimum number that
should be detected by the guards?
b. BASE ADMISSION. Out of every 100 unauthorized
persons who might try to gain access to the installation
through other than normal entry gates, what is the minimum
number that should be detected by the security force?
c. BASE ADMISSION. Out of every 100 unauthorized
vehicles that might try to gain access to the installation
through normal entry gates, what is the minimum number that
should be detected by the gate guards?
d. UNAUTHORIZED MATERIAL. Out of every 100 cases where
an individual might try to bring unauthorized material
aboard the base, how many should be detected by the security
force as a minimum?
3. The fifth question referred to unsecured safes and asked:
Out of every 100 cases where a classified material storage
container has been left unsecured by the appropriate custo-




Within Within Within Within
4 Hours 8 Hours 12 Hours 24 Hours
- 90 _ _
- 100 - -
- 100 - -
- 100 - -
- 4 - -
30 20 10 10
4. The last question asked: When a security alarm is
sounded anywhere on the installation, what is the minimum












6 July 19 76
QUESTIONNAIRE FOR SECURITY PLANNING
This is a continuation of the exercise which began
9 June 1976. The results are attached. Please answer the
reworded questions that are provided below. If your new
answer lies at one of the extreme ends of the list of previ-
ous answers that were given for the same question, please
state briefly the reason why.
1. BASE ADMISSION . Out of every 10Q unauthor-
ized persons who might try to gain access to the
installation through normal entry gates, what is
the minimum acceptable number that should be
detected by the gate guard?
2. BASE ADMISSION . Out of every 100 unauthor-
ized persons who might try to gain access to the
installation through other than normal entry gates
what is the minimum acceptable number that should
be detected by the security force?
3. BASE ADMISSION . Out of every 100 unauthor-
ized vehicles that might try to gain access to the
installation through normal entry gates, what is
the minimum acceptable number that should be detec-
ted by the gate guards?
4. UNAUTHORIZED MATERIAL . Out of every 100
cases where an individual might try to bring un-
authorized material aboard the base (guns, ex-
plosives, drugs, etc.), what is the minimum
acceptable number that should be detected by the
security force?
5. UNSECURED SAFES . Out of every 100 cases
where a classified material storage container
has been left unsecured by the appropriate cus-
todian, how many should be detected by the
security force?
(1) Within 4 hours?
(2) Within 8 hours?
(3) Within 12 hours?
(4) Within 24 hours?
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6. REACTION TIME . When a security alarm is
sounded anywhere on the installation/ what is
the maximum acceptable time (in minutes) between
when the alarm was sounded and the security




QUESTIONNAIRE FOR SECURITY PLANNING
This is a continuation of the exercise for security
planning. The items addressed in previous questionnaires
are repeated below, but this time values are given for each
item. These values are medians that were calculated from the
group answers provided in the last questionnaire.
You are now asked to weight each item. One hundred (100)
points are to be distributed to the various items based on
your perception of the relative importance of that item within
the list. Please distribute these 100 points in the space
provided, so that the sum equals 100.
1- BASE ADMISSION
. Out of every 100 unauthorized
persons who might try to gain access to the
installation through normal entry gates, 9_8
should be detected by the gate guards.
2. BASE ADMISSION . Out of every 100 unauthorized
persons who might try to gain access to the
installation through other than normal entry
gates, 61 should be detected by the security force.
3. BASE ADMISSION . Out of every 100 unauthorized
vehicles that might try to gain access to the
installation through normal entry gates, 9_8_
should be detected by the gate guards.
4. UNAUTHORIZED MATERIAL . Out of every 100 cases
where an individual might try to bring unauthor-
ized material aboard the base, (guns, explosives
drugs, etc.) , 3_3 should be detected by the
security force.
UNSECURED SAFES . Out of every 100 cases where a
classified material storage container has been
left unsecured by the appropriate custodian,
62 should be detected within 4 hours
86 should be detected within 8 hours
10~0 should be detected within 12 hours
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6. REACTION TIME . When a security alarm is sounded
anywhere on the installation, the maximum accept-
able time (in minutes) between when the alarm wa;
sounded and when the security force reaches the





RESULTS OF THE QUESTIONNAIRE
FOR WEIGHTING SECURITY GOALS
1. Six responses to the questionnaire were received.
2. Individual and average weight for each question are
given in the following table.
Question Numbers
1 2 3 4 5 6
2 2 2 1 20 15
10 10 3 2 30 25
10 10 4 5 40 30
10 10 5 10 45 30
10 10 10 10 45 30
10 10 10 14 50 60




QUESTIONNAIRE FOR SECURITY PLANNING
This is a continuation of the exercise for security
planning. The results of the previous questionnaire for
weighting the different items are attached.
You are asked to reconsider the answers you have previ-
ously given, and to again place weighting values on each
item. The same procedure is to be used as before, where 100
points are to be distributed to the various items based on
your perception of the relative importance of the items with-
in the list.
BASE ADMISSION . Out of every 100 unauthorized
persons who might try to gain access to the
installation through normal entry gates, 9_8
should be detected by the gate guards.
BASE ADMISSION . Out of every 100 unauthorized
persons who might try to gain access to the
installation through other than normal entry
gates, 61 should be detected by the security force
BASE ADMISSION . Out of every 100 unauthorized
vehicles that might try to gain access to the
installation through normal entry gates, 9_8
should be detected by the gate guards.
UNAUTHORIZED MATERIAL . Out of every 100 cases
where an individual might try to bring unauthor-
ized material aboard the base, (guns, explosives
drugs, etc.) , 33_ should be detected by the
security force.
UNSECURED SAFES . Out of every 100 cases where a
classified material storage container has been
left unsecured by the appropriate custodian,
62 should be detected within 4 hours
06 should be detected within 8 hours
10~0 should be detected within 12 hours
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6. REACTION TIME . When a security alarm is sounded
anywhere on the installation, the maximum accept-
able time between when the alarm was sounded and
when the security force reaches the scene of the
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